Right to Counsel by unknown
Touro Law Review 
Volume 8 Number 1 Article 58 
1991 
Right to Counsel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal 
Procedure Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Legal 
Profession Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United 
States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
(1991) "Right to Counsel," Touro Law Review: Vol. 8 : No. 1 , Article 58. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/58 
This New York State Constitutional Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ 
Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
N.Y. CO ST. art. I, § 6:
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be al-
lowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil
actions ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Davis914
(decided February 15, 1990)
Defendant contended that her incriminating statements made to
sheriff's deputies should be suppressed, despite an oral and writ-
ten waiver of her constitutional right to obtain counsel, 915
because she had invoked her right to an attorney the previous
day. She also contended that her prior request for legal assistance
rendered her legally incapable of waiving her Miranda rights,
including her right to counsel.
The county court denied defendant's motion to suppress the
statements made subsequent to the waiver, because the waiver
was given almost one full day after her request for legal assis-
tance. This meant that the defendant had fifteen hours to secure
such assistance if she so desired. The appellate division reversed
and suppressed the statements made by the defendant, holding
that a suspect who invokes a right to counsel cannot effectively
waive it thereafter in the absence of an attorney, even when not
continuously being detained by the police.9 16 The court of
appeals reversed and held that the defendant could withdraw her
914. 75 N.Y.2d 517, 553 N.E.2d 1008, 554 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1990).
915. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
916. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d at 519, 553 N.E.2d at 1009, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
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earlier request for counsel and effectively waive that right
"before an attorney enters the case if proceedings have not
begun. "917
The defendant was indicted for two counts of aggravated sexual
assault and two counts of second degree murder. On August 25,
1985, the defendant had been questioned by sheriffs deputies, in
her home, after receiving her Miranda warnings. At this time,
the defendant was in a non-custodial setting. When the question-
ing began, the defendant informed the deputies that she wanted
an attorney. The defendant then made several inculpatory
statements and expressed a desire to continue talking with the
deputies the next day. The following day, the defendant
voluntarily accompanied the deputies to the sheriffs office to
continue the questioning. 918 It is undisputed that the defendant, at
this time, was in custody. During this session the defendant
waived her constitutional rights, orally and in writing, after being
advised of them several times. The defendant then gave a detailed
audio taped, video taped and written confession. 919
Both the federal 920 and state921 constitutions guarantee the
right to counsel in criminal proceedings. Generally, this right is a
personal right and may be waived by the defendant without notice
to his or her counsel. In New York, however, the right extends
beyond the right afforded by the sixth amendment of the United
States Constitution because it is "grounded on this State's
constitutional and statutory guarantees." ' 922 In two situations the
right attaches indelibly and a waiver will not be recognized unless
expressed in the presence of counsel. 923 The first situation occurs
after formal proceedings have begun and the second situation
"relates to uncharged individuals in custody who have retained or
917. Id. at 519, 523-24, 553 N.E.2d at 1010, 1012-13, 554' N.Y.S.2d at
462, 464-65.
918. Id. at 518-19, 553 N.E.2d at 1009, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
919. Id. at 520, 553 N.E.2d at 1010, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
920. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
921. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
922. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d at 521, 553 N.E.2d at 1010, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
923. Id. at 521, 553 N.E.2d at 1011, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
[Vol 8
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [2020], Art. 58
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/58
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
requested an attorney." 924 Although the plaintiff was in custody
during the second interrogation, the county court held "that
defendant's request for counsel had lost its legal significance and
that the subsequent waiver was valid" 925 because there was a
significant time lapse between the invocation of her right to
counsel and her waiver during the interrogation the following
day. During this time lapse, the defendant had ample opportunity
to secure legal assistance but failed to do so. The defendant was
also willing to talk to the deputies further. She expressed this to
the deputies on August 25th, before they left her home. In
addition, the defendant voluntarily accompanied the deputies to
the sheriffs office on August 26th.926 This fact was instrumental
when the court considered whether the defendant's waiver was
potentially valid. The court remanded the matter to the appellate
division for further consideration to determine whether the
defendant intended to waive her right to counsel. 927
The court determined that in non-custodial interviews, the co-
ercion and influence of the state is limited because the defendant
can refuse to respond or can walk away. At this early stage of the
process, the court noted, "there is no legal requirement that an
attorney be present before the witness changes an earlier decision
to remain silent and talk[] to the authorities. The right may be in-
voked or waived at will before proceedings have
commenced. ' 928 Further, the court stated that the People have
the burden of proving that there was a knowing and voluntary
waiver. An express withdrawal of a previous request for counsel
is preferred. However, a hearing court is also justified in finding
a waiver based upon such circumstances as whether the defendant
was read her constitutional rights before the waiver, whether the
defendant initiated further communication with the police, and
whether "there ha[d] been a break in the interrogation after the
defendant ha[d] asserted the need for counsel with a reasonable
924. Id.
925. Id. at 524, 553 N.E.2d at 1013, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
926. Id.
927. Id.
928. Id. at 522-23, 553 N.E.2d at 1012, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 464 (citing
People v. Gary, 31 N.Y.2d 68, 286 N.E.2d 263, 334 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1972)).
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opportunity during the break for the suspect to contact an
attorney." ' 929 In this case, the defendant had fifteen hours to
procure legal assistance and failed to do so. Therefore, the court
held that the defendant was free to waive her right to counsel
even though she did so while in a custodial setting. The case was
remanded for further consideration to determine whether she
actually intended to validly waive her rights. 930
On the federal level, in Edwards v. Arizona,931 the United
States Supreme Court established that while a suspect may no
longer be interrogated without the presence of counsel, once the
suspect has invoked his or her right to counsel, the suspect may
effectively waive that previously invoked right by initiating the
communication with officials and by volunteering information. 932
Thus, once an accused has invoked the right to counsel, further
interrogation by officials is prohibited "unless the accused him-
self initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations
with the police." 933
The Supreme Court further clarified this rule in Oregon v.
Bradshaw.934 In Bradshaw, the Court explained that the Edwards
rule "was in effect a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an
accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers
.... 935 Further, the Court explained that if such further
interrogation occurs upon the accused's initiative, after he has
invoked his right to counsel, "the burden remains upon the
prosecution to show that subsequent events indicated a waiver of
the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during the
929. Id. at 523, 553 N.E.2d at 1012, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 464 (citation
omitted).
930. Id. at 523-24, 553 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 464-65. On
remand, the appellate division held that "defendant validly waived her right to
counsel prior to confessing to Sheriff's deputies on August 26, 1985." People
v. Davis, 162 A.D.2d 943, 559 N.Y.S.2d 192 (4th Dept), appeal denied, 76
N.Y.2d 892, 562 N.E.2d 879, 561 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1990) (citiation omitted).
931. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
932. Id. at 485.
933. Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added).
934. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
935. Id. at 1044.
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Based upon these decisions, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that a defendant who reinitiated a con-
versation with police only minutes after he invoked his right to
counsel, by stating that he was aware of his rights but wished to
proceed with the interrogation without counsel, effectively
waived his right to the assistance of counsel. 93
7
More recently, the United States Supreme Court reinforced its
decisions in Minnick v. Mississippi.938 In Minnick, the Court
stated that, "Edwards does not foreclose finding a waiver of Fifth
Amendment protections after counsel has been requested, pro-
vided the accused has initiated the conversation or discussions
with the authorities . "...-939 Thus, on the federal level, a defen-
dant is capable of waiving the right to counsel subsequent to his
or her invocation of the right if she or he initiates further com-
munication.
While the federal rule allows for waiver of the right to counsel
when initiated by the defendant, such initiation will only be a
factor on the state level in determining whether a defendant ac-
tually intended to waive the right to counsel. Provided the de-
fendant does intend to waive his or her right to counsel, an attor-
ney has not yet entered the case, and proceedings have not begun,
the defendant does have the power, on the state level, to revoke
his or her prior request and waive the right to counsel. Therefore,
it is clear that a criminal suspect does have the power on the fed-
eral and state level to waive his or her right to counsel.
People v. Bing940
(decided July 2, 1990)
Three defendants were prosecuted separately for crimes unre-
936. Id.
937. United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1113 (10th Cir. 1988).
938. 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990).
939. Id. at 492.
940. 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990); see
Comment, Interaction Between State and Federal Right to Counsel: The
Overruling ofBartolomeo, 8 TouRo L. REv. 191 (1991).
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